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One of the difficulties that faces the historian of philosophy is that his subject is not at all clearly demarcated for him. Not only has the prevalent view of its relation to other subjects, and especially to the natural sciences, been liable to frequent changes in the course of time, but at any given period there may be very wide differences in the aims and methods of those who are deemed to be engaged in its pursuit. This would not be a very serious matter if it came to no more than the fact that the word 'philosophy' was used rather loosely. If the different sorts of enquiry to which it was applied could be effectively distinguished, we could attach different labels to them, and leave to the lexicographers the drudgeryof deciding whether the whole set of labels was to be grouped under the heading of 'philosophy', or whether some different grouping, which gave a narrower sense to the term, was more advisable. Unfortunately, the position is not so simple. We do, indeed, distinguish different branches of philosophy, such as logic, the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, ethics and political theory, but the conflicting views of the aims and methods of philosophy operate within these branches themselves, even to the point where it is disputed whether some alleged branch of the subject, such as metaphysics, is a genuine pursuit at all, and here the differences are seldom, if ever, so straightforward as a disagreement about the correct or most fruitful applications of a word. They are traceable rather to different conceptions of the world and of men's position in it.
It is because these differences are so persistent that philosophy is exposed to the charge which is frequently brought against it, especially by natural scientists, that it fails to exhibit any progress. Problems which were raised by Plato and Aristotle in the fourth century Be are still discussed, and the work of all the intervening centuries has brought us no nearer to finding a solution of them which even a majority of contemporary philosophers would accept. I believe this charge to be unjust, even though the appearances are in its favour. What must be conceded is that if there is any progress in philosophy it does not take the linear form which characterizes the progress of a natural science. The historian of physics can show how the Ptolemaic system of astronomy was supplanted in the fifteenth century by the heliocentric system of Copernicus; how the Copernican system led to the development a century later of the theories of Kepler and Galileo; how these theories were improved and incorporated in Newton's classical mechanics; how Newton's principles came into conflict in the nineteenth century with the electromagnetic theory of Clerk-Maxwell, himself building on the discoveries of Faraday; and how the conflict was resolved in Einstein's theories of relativity. The speculations, say, of Kepler may still be profitably studied in their historical context, but they do not still stand as rivals to the theories of Einstein. Like the instruments of technology, the theories of physics work for a time and are then superseded. The transition is not always smooth, but however revolutionary the new theory may be, however much, like the quantum theory, it breaks with established concepts, once it has proved its value as a tool of explanation and prediction, it wins general acceptance.
It is otherwise with philosophy. The historian of philosophy can, indeed, trace the influence of one philosopher upon another, especially within the confines of what is represented as a particular 'school'. He can show, for example, how Berkeley reacted against Locke and in what ways Hume followed and repudiated both of them. He can go even further and establish the connections between members of different schools. He can show the extent to which Descartes, the seventeenth century founder of modern western philosophy, still makes use of mediaeval concepts; he can show how Kant was inspired by what he saw as the need for refuting Hume ; and what Hegel in his turn owed to Kant. There is, however, no question of one of these philosophers superseding another, except in the sense that his work may enjoy a period of greater popularity. One can still maintain, without forfeiting one's claim to competence in philosophy, that Hume was right and Kant wrong on the point at issue between them, that Locke came nearer to the truth than either Berkeley or Hume, that as against Kant it was Hegel who took the wrong turning. One can still be a Platonist, while fully understanding Aristotle's criticism of Plato, and without being ignorant of all the positions that different philosophers have taken in the centuries that have passed since Plato lived.
In what then can the progress in philosophy consist? To find an answer, we must, I think, look not to the contributions which have been made to the subject by a series of eminent persons, but rather to the evolution of a set of perennial problems. Chief among them perhaps is the problem of objectivity, appearing sometimes as a source of division between realists and idealists, sometimes as the issue between absolute and relativistic theories of truth. The fundamental question is whether, and to what degree, it is possible for us to describe things as they really are, independently of their relation to ourselves: and here, if a relativistic position is taken, it has to be decided whether the frame of reference is supplied by human beings in general, by one or other society, by a society at different stages of its development, or simply by oneself. The division between realists and idealists also has many facets, comprising as it does a number of conflicting views concerning the constitution of mind andmatter, and their mutual relation, this question calling in its turn for an enquiry into the character and scope of human knowledge.
The assessment of our capacity for knowledge not only provides a principal point of entry for the philosophical sceptic, recurrently posing a challenge, which stimulates theory by calling for a fresh response, but also sets the stage for another deep division of philosophers into rationalists and empiricists. Here again the dispute takes different forms, according as the lines between reason and experience are more or less sharply drawn, but overall it is the mark of an empiricist that he looks to sense-perception, if not as the sole legitimate source of any true belief about the 'external' world, at least as a final court of appeal which any acceptable theory must satisfy. The stumbling block for anyone who holds a position of this sort is the development of the 'pure' sciences of logic and mathematics which seem to possess a security which sensory observation could not bestow on them. One way of dealing with it has been to deny them this security by making the difference between them and the propositions of the natural sciences at most a difference of degree, so that they too are open to revision in the light of further experience. Another has been to grant them their security, but treat it .as a gift that we bestow upon them. On this view, they do no more than spell out the consequences of the meanings that we attach to logical or numerical signs. They are useful as tools of inference, but not descriptions of reality. A compromise put forward by Immanuel Kant, at least with regard to mathematics, is that its propositions owe their necessity to their stemming from our ordering of the world in space and time, which is a precondition of its being accessible to our understanding. This makes them descriptive not of reality as it is in itself, but of the outcome of the way in which we are bound to process it, or rather of our contribution to this outcome. Whether this special form of relativism, which is peculiar to Kant and his followers, should be accepted is again a matter for dispute.
While empiricists concur in giving the leading part to sense-perception in their theories of knowledge, they do not all take the same view of what sense-perception is. The most common opinion which John Locke, officially regarded as the founder of modern empiricism, inherited from the rationalist Rene Descartes, has been that the immediate objects of sight or touch or any other of our senses are what they both called 'ideas', conceived by them and by most, though not all, of those who have adopted a similar starting point, as mental entities which have no existence apart from the particular sensations in which they figure. For the most part, those who have held a position of.this sort have treated the physical objects, which we are ordinarily said to see or touch, as mediate objects of perception. They. are represented as being known to us only by inference as the causes of our sensations. This raises the problem how the inference can be justified and allows also for disagreement concerning the nature of these objects. How far do they resemble their sensory effects? Other philosophers, also claiming to be empiricists, have opposed the introduction of anything like 'ideas' as the immediate data of sense, on the ground that it artificially imprisons us in private worlds, and have conceived of physical objects as directly perceptible. In their case, the question has arisen whether they are doing justice to the scientific evidence, which anyhow creates a problem for all theories of perception. They need to explain how the particles, or other objects, which answer to the concepts of contemporary physics, are related to the physical objects of everyday discourse, which are credited with perceptible qualities by common sense.
For rationalists, mathematics tends to serve as a paradigm not only because of the certainty which is claimed for it, but above all because of its employment of deductive reasoning. The rationalist typically holds that men are endowed with a faculty of intellectual intuition. Truth is ascribed to the propositions which this faculty authenticates and to everything that follows logically from them. The ideal is to discover the fewest possible number of self-evident premises, which deductively yield a complete description of reality. When rationalism is blended with idealism, as in the case of Hegel and his followers, reality is identified with a coherent system of judgments, rather than with anything outside the system to which its constituents might be supposed to refer. In some cases, such as that of Descartes, the deductive or would-be deductive method is used to vindicate the theories of contemporary science. In others, these theories are condemned as failing to satisfy the demands of reason. Thus, the neo-Hegelians, Bradley and McTaggart, were not afraid to maintain that neither space nor time nor matter were ultimately real. The drawing of so sharp a distinction between appearance and reality has, indeed, been a relatively uncommon feature of western philosophy, but even more circumspect rationalists, like Leibniz and Spinoza, who saw their systems as according with the science of their day, gave accounts of the world which were greatly at variance with the beliefs of common sense. One reason for this is that the tendency of common sense has been to take the evidence of sense-perception at its face value, whereas in all rationalist systems sense-perception is downgraded. An outstanding example is provided by Plato, who advanced the view that the mutable objects of everyday acceptance owed the inferior degrees of reality that he was willing to accord them only to their participation in a timeless system of abstract forms, by which the standard of reality was set.
That abstract entities are real, let alone that they serve as a model for the assessment of reality, has not been an uncontested thesis. It figures in yet another area of constant philosophical dispute. This dispute has several facets, of which the most prominent has been what is technically known as the problem of universals. The simplest definition of a universal is that it is either a quality or a relation, and the problem of the status of qualities and relations is bound up with the conflicting views that have been taken both of their connection with one another and of their connection with the particular things, if any, which they characterize. The extreme antithesis to Plato's theory of forms is the 'nominalist' view that there is nothing more to things having a common quality than our choosing to apply the same label to them. In the interval we find the view of Aristotle that universals are real, though not independently of the things in which they inhere, the 'conceptualist' theory, which found some favour in the middle ages, that concepts are mental but things naturally fall under them; the theory, held by Leibniz, which tries to resolve relations into qualities, and its converse, the more moderate form of nominalism, in which common qualities are replaced by special relations of similarity, which sort out objects into sets, united in each case by their resemblance to some particular exemplar.
It may seem strange that Berkeley, who held this theory, also maintained that things were bundles of qualities. This was because he could discover no sense in the notion of material substance: a rejection which other empiricists have extended to any sort of substance, conceived, after Locke's fashion, as 'an unknown somewhat', supporting some collection of properties. Among philosophers who have found the need to distinguish particular concrete objects from their properties, there has been disagreement over the questions whether or not these particulars can be numerically different, while sharing all the same general properties, whether the possession of any or all of their properties is necessary for their being what they are, whether we are bound to conceive of some of them at least as persisting through time, or whether they can be 'reduced' to a series of events. Nor is it only the notion of substance that has been put in question. Properties too have been considered suspect, and it has been suggested that they give way to classes which would then be the only abstract entities that we should countenance. This suggestion has, however, been opposed in its turn, on the ground that the admission of classes violates the 'nominalistic' principle that no two entities can have the same basic content. If, for example, I am allowed to distinguish myself from the unit class of which I am the only member, and this class from the class of classes in which it shares membership with the null-class, which has no members at all, I can multiply entities to any extent I please. One way of countering this logical extravagance has been to deny the existence of anything but individuals. It might be thought that this was yet another condemnation of abstract entities, but that turns out not to be so. In this form of nominalism, an individual need not be something that can be sufficiently distinguished from other things of its kind by its spatiotemporal location, which is what is required of a concrete particular. An abstract entity, like a colour, is counted as an individual if it functions as a single element in various composite wholes. All nominalists agree in accepting William of Ockham's famous principle, familiarly known as Ockham's razor, that entities are not to be needlessly multiplied. If this still allows them to differ over the question what entities are needed, it is mainly because they are at odds, not only with the rationalists, but also with one another, in their responses to the deeper question what constitutes the need.
Attempts have been made to dispose of the Platonic view of universals by ascribing it to what is said to be the obvious error of construing general terms as names. Whatever the force of this argument, it does bring out the point that there is a close connection between the different views taken of the relative status of particulars and universals and different interpretations of our use of singular and general terms. For instance, the rejection of common qualities in favour of relations of similarity is an obvious off-shoot of the thesis that we come to understand general terms through a process of abstraction which leads us to select the different ways in which things resemble one another. Another example is the manifest parallel between the thesis that things are bundles of qualities and the belief that singular terms can be transmuted into predicates. More generally, the reality attributed to abstract entities has been considered by some as essential, and by others as fatal, to the development of an adequate theory of meaning. The question is how a series of sounds, or written marks, succeed in functioning as signs of something other than themselves. Clearly, it is not merely a matter of their physical constitution. The mere fact that a written mark has such and such a size and shape cannot account for its being a singular or general term. It is not the acoustic qualities of a series of noises that alone make them form an indicative sentence, the utterance maybe of a truth or falsehood. If sounds and inscriptions assume the character of words and sentences, it is because they are so interpreted. But in what does this interpretation consist? A simple answer to this question is that it consists in our being induced by them to focus our attention upon one or other of a range of abstract entities. So the concatenation of the letters 'r' 'e' and 'd' in that order becomes an inscription ofthe English word 'red' by presenting an English speaker with the concept of redness. The same office is performed for a French speaker by the sequence of letters 'r' '0' 'u' 's' 'e'. Similarly, the English sentence 'All is lost save honour' and the French sentence 'Tout est perdu fors l'honneur' are supposed to acquire meaning, and in this case the same meaning, because they are both understood to 'express' the proposition that all is lost except honour. Such concepts and propositions are supposed to exist objectively, whether or not they are ever brought to anyone's attention. Neither does it matter to their existence whether the concepts actually apply to anything, or whether the propositions are true or false.
This theory is more nakedly exposed to an objection of the same order as that which the advocates of a commonsense treatment of preception brought against 'the theory of ideas'. It can be argued that the interposition of abstract entities between our utterances and the actual things we want to talk about constitutes a barrier rather than a bridge. Neither does our being treated to such statements as that sentences mean propositions serve to provide us with any explanation of meaning; it is as if we wanted to know about nutrition and were told no more than that what we eat is food. A causal approach, in which signs are treated as stimuli, appears more fruitful; but the attempts which have so far been made to relate the meaning of signs to the occasions of their utterance and the associated behaviour of their interpreters have come a long way short of fulfilling their promise. It may be that we have to take some semantic notion such as that of 'truth' or 'reference' as primitive, but even on this favourable basis the construction ora satisfactory theory of meaning has yet to be achieved.
Similar divisions are found in the sphere of moral philosophy. Here too the claim has been made that we can know by intuition that actions of such and such a type are absolutely right or wrong, or that such and such states of affairs are intrinsically good or evil. Those who maintain a position of this type may differ in their opinion of the relations that moral terms like 'right' and 'good', 'duty' and 'obligation' bear to one another, but they agree in taking at least one of them to apply to a property that its possessors really have, independently of their effects upon us or our attitudes towards them. Such properties are held to be 'nonnatural', in the sense that although they may be supervenient upon the physical and mental properties of their possessors, they do not themselves fall into either class.
Some philosophers who have refused to allow that the truth of moral propositions can be known by intuition, have adopted the view that moral qualities are the objects of what they have called a moral sense. This is more than a nominal dispute, since those who believe in a moral sense would dismiss non-natural qualities as mythical. Their view of moral qualities is rather that they are analogous to colours, when these are treated not as intrinsic properties of physical objects but merely as 'ideas' which we receive from these objects through our physical senses. The truth of moral propositions is accordingly made to depend upon our responses to the situations to which they refer; whether it be the responses of the speaker himself, or those of the normal members of the society to which he belongs. There is, indeed, an extension of this approach which denies any truth-value to moral statements, except in so far as they are merely descriptions of the workings of accepted codes. Beyond this, they merely express the speaker's valuations, possibly with the intention that others will thereby be induced to share them.
These are not the only forms that a naturalistic theory of ethics may take. There has been a long tradition of identifying good with pleasure and evil with pain, and philosophers who have followed this tradition have sometimes maintained that it is right to seek most pleasure for oneself, more often that one should try to maximize utility, in the sense of bringing about 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'. A view of this kind may also be taken by those who construe happiness in terms of the satisfaction of desire, without making the assumption that what is desired is only the achievement of pleasure or the avoidance of pain. There is too the question whether the criterion of utility, in this sense, is to be applied to the circumstances of each particular action, or whether it is sufficient that the action fall under some rule the observance of which is generally beneficial.
The conflict between rationalists and empiricists extends even to political theory. The issue here is whether one believes in such things as natural rights, or natural justice, or whether one finds a conventional basis for every form of political obligation in the view which the members of a given society take of their several or collective interests.
We have seen that rationalism and idealism do not always go together. When they do, as in the case of Hegel and his followers, they tend to be associated with monism, the conception of reality which lays stress on its unity. The opposition of monism and pluralism, which again has many different aspects, is the third of the principal divisions in philosophy. In its extreme form, monism sees it as a matter of logic that everything is unified. It is in this spirit that metaphysicians, since the time of Parmenides, who was born in the sixth century Be, have denied the reality of change and motion. In some cases, their position has rested on the assumption that all relations are internal to their terms, in the sense that they help to constitute the identity of the things which they relate. Since any two things are somehow related, if only spatiotemporally, this has the startling consequence that we cannot refer to anything without referring to everything; for in saying that anyone object exists, we shall be implicitly affirming the existence of all the others. Some metaphysicians, who have shrunk from drawing this conclusion, have adopted the hardly less ridiculous alternative that we never do succeed in referring adequately to anything, with the consequence, which they do not shrink from accepting, that nothing that we say about the world is ever altogether true.
The extreme form of pluralism is the assumption that all relations are external, with the consequence that the existence of anyone object is logically independent of the existence of any other. A difficulty here is that logical independence is a function of the way in which the objects in question are described. An author's relation to his works is external, in the sense that he might have existed without writing them, but it is internalized by the description of him as their author. The position of the extreme pluralist, therefore, needs to be more carefully formulated. He must be understood to hold both that a great, perhaps infinite, number of things exist and that each of them is self-contained, in the sense that it is possible to find a way of describing its properties which is complete, to the extent that there is no one of them that could not be added to the list, and also such that one never comes upon a relational property the possession of which is essential to the thing's identity. So stated, this is a very strong condition. It may have to be weakened a little, to allow the pluralist's objects to occupy positions in space and time, for this will then be a facet of their identity, and their inclusion in a spatiotemporal system may be seen as a derogation from their independence. It will, however, be mitigated by the fact of its always being contingent that they occupy the spatiotemporal positions that they do. Even if it be necessary in the case of any given object X that there be some other objects which are spatiotemporally related to it, there will be no particular objects Y and Z to which it is necessarily so related.
If the elements of a system of this kind are observable, and there is also a method for deciding with respect to each of the properties whether a given element possesses it or not, then all the propositions which are descriptive of the system can be tested independently of one another. This is not, in general, true of scientific theories because of the relatively loose manner in which these theories are adjusted to the observational data by which they are sustained. The result is that when they run, or appear to run, foul of observation, there is never only a single way in which harmony can be restored. If the perceptual evidence is accepted, some part of the theory will have to be modified or sacrificed, but we have a liberal choice as to what changes we make. This point is sometimes made by saying that the proportions of a scientific theory face the verdict of experience, not individually but as a whole. Some philosophers take this 'holism' further to the point of saying that every accredited observation puts the whole corpus of our beliefs at risk, but this is surely an exaggeration. Admittedly, we cannot say in advance how far our enquiries will carry us: a chemical discovery may lead us to revise our ascriptions of works of art; a fresh piece of historical evidence may reactivate a medical hypothesis which had been too readily discarded. Nevertheless, the success of scientific experiments depends on our being able to treat small numbers -of our beliefs as isolated from the rest. We should have no hope of lighting on particular causes and effects unless we could reduce the field of possible candidates to a manageable compass. We may never be quite sure that we have not overlooked some relevant factor, but if everything were relevant, nothing could ever be ascertained. Even at the height of an epidemic a doctor can, and indeed must, treat one patient at a time; nor would his practice be likely to be improved by an excursion into the politics of the early Roman Empire. This is not to reject the monistic view that everything can ultimately be explained in terms of the laws that govern the behaviour of homogeneous particles. It is at most to insist that even if this were true, the application of these laws to particular cases would depend upon a limited number of particular circumstances. Whether any such view is to be accounted true is not a purely philosophical question. It comes within the province of the philosophy of science to decide what is to pass for the 'reduction' of one special science to another, of biology to chemistry, for example, or of chemistry to physics: but once the requirements are set, the question whether they can be fulfilled is a matter for scientific discovery. Again, once the conditions for homogeneity are fixed, the question whether they are satisfied belongs to physics. That the 'ultimate' particles of matter are homogeneous, in any unforced sense of this term, is not something that can be taken for granted in advance of physical theory and experiment.
Neither is the concept of matter itself unproblematic, any more than the concept of mind. These concepts are intertwined with those of publicity and privacy, but they do not run exactly parallel. For instance, shadows and reflections and mirages are public, but one might hesitate to call them material; thoughts are mental but it is not immediately obvious that they are incapable of being shared. Some philosophers have maintained that thoughts are also physical. Their view has been that all events are physical, but that a few of them also answer to mental descriptions. Others have followed a monistic approach of the opposite kind. They have argued that the things which pass for physical objects are nothing but classes of sensations, whether actual or possible. Others again have held that both mind and matter are constructible out of 'neutral' elements of experience, the differences lying only in the difference of relations among these common elements.
Among the divergent views of this question, there is the view, held by Spinoza, that thought and physical extension are modes of a single substance; the view, held by Descartes and others, that there are both mental and physical substances; the view, held by Berkeley, that there are only mental substances; and the view, held by Hobbes and others, that there are only material substances but that some of these material substances have irreducibly mental properties. Among philosophers who have felt obliged to dispense with the concept of substances, replacing it with that of the co-ocurrence of properties, the questions have again arisen whether these properties are uniquely mental, or uniquely physical, whether some are both mental and physical, or whether these properties are of two distinct kinds, which are mutually irreducible, in the sense that members of the one class are neither logically nor physically identifiable with those of the other. This leaves open the question of their causal relationship and here it has been held, alternatively, that they interact; that physical properties are causally dependent on mental properties, in the sense that they depend for their existence on being known; that mental properties are causally dependent on the physical state of the person who 'owns' them, however this person may be thought to be constituted; that mental properties have only mental effects; and that mental properties are causally inoperative, as being the effects of physical properties, but not themselves the cause of anything. This last view is held by those who believe that the physical world is a closed system; that everything that happens can be accounted for in physical terms, if it can be accounted for at all; but that there are mental occurrencies, which are not themselves physical, though there may be physical explanations for them.
Finally, pluralism may take the form of denying that there is a single world, which is waiting there to be captured, with a greater or lesser degree of truth, by our narratives, our scientific theories or even our artistic representations. There are as many worlds as we are able to construct by the use of different systems of concepts, different standards of measurement, different forms of expression and exemplification. Our account of anyone such world may be more or less accurate, our representations more or less acceptable, but when two rival systems come into conflict there may be no way of adjudicating between them. In that case there may be no sense in asking which is right. The strength of such a view is the truism that we cannot envisage a world of any sort, independently of some method of depicting it; its weakness is that it blurs the distinction between fact and fancy. For all the attractions of pluralism, we do not want to be driven into admitting that 'anything goes'. I embarked on this review of philosophical standpoints, with the avowed intention of showing that there can be progress in philosophy. It may, however, appear that I have achieved just the opposite. If so many conflicting theories remain in the field, each with its partisans, what issues can be said to have been even provisionally resolved? And if none of the issues has been resolved, in what can the progress be supposed to consist? I can answer this objection only by saying that the progress consists, not in the disappearance of any of the age-old problems, nor in the increasing dominance of one or other of the conflicting sects, but in a change in the fashion in which the problems are posed, and in an increasing measure of agreement concerning the character of their solution. As in a guessing game, the players have not yet found the answers, but they have narrowed the area in which they can reside. I shall try to explain this in greater detail, by making a number of specific points.
(l) An outstanding feature of twentieth-century philosophy, of whatever sort, has been the growth of its self-consciousness. Philosophers have been more seriously concerned with the purpose of their activity and the proper method of conducting it. This has been due mainly to two causes: first, the conspicuous progress made in the natural and, to a lesser extent, the social sciences, and, secondly, the detachment of philosophy from science which took place in the nineteenth century, partly through the sciences' insistence on their own autonomy and partly through the involvement of philosophy in the romantic movement. Though Kant, writing at the close of the eighteenth century, was able to talk of philosophy as the queen of the sciences, the restoration of this sovereignty has been neither conceded nor seriously claimed. In this connection, it is interesting to note that there is a present tendency for formal logic to detach itself from the main body of philosophy, just for the reason that it is the one branch of the subject that has made continuous progress throughout the century in a scientific fashion, and consequently lays claim to scientific mastery of its own concerns.
(2) This is "not to deny that there is a scope for a philosophy of logic just as there is scope for a philosophy of physics, a philosophy of history, a philosophy of law, or a philosophy of art. What has been recognized is that philosophy is not competitive with any of these subjects, though it may seek to bring illumination to them. The philosopher of art does not supply recipes for writing poems, or for painting pictures: he does discuss the nature of symbolism, the sense, if any, in which a poem or a picture may lay claim to truth; he may try to supply criteria for the evaluation of a work of art. Similarly, the philosopher of physics does not engage in physical speculations: there are no new planets, or particles, that sweep into his ken. He may try to put a sharper edge on certain physical concepts, such as that of probability or the fulfilment of a function, but principally his is a task of interpretation. He examines the relation of physical theories to their evidence, the differences in their structure, the ways they evolve out of one another, their pretensions to objectivity, their compatibility with the assumptions of common sense.
(3) The implication is that philosophy takes its subject matter from elsewhere; whether it be from one or other of the arts or sciences, or the pre-and semi-scientific beliefs and discourse of everyday "life. Its standpoint is critical and explanatory. One of the discoveries which has been made is that it lacks the capital for setting up in business on its own.
(4) This does not preclude the elaboration of a world view, though philosophical systembuilding has gone almost wholly out of fashion. It does, however, require that the world view incorporate the "deliverances of science and possibly also of the arts. What has been discarded is the idea that one can proceed deductively from allegedly self-evident first principles, and arrive by pure reflection at a picture of the world, which has an independent claim to validity. Even those pluralists who talk of our making worlds are bound to admit that what we describe or express or exemplify is not entirely subject to our fancies. There are limits to what it will tolerate. If we have always to look through some pair of spectacles, not all" of which yield the same results, we still have to look through them. Merely to wear them is not enough.
(5) The common belief that 'it is the business of the philosopher to tell men how they ought to Iive', although it has the authority of Plato, is based upon a fallacy. The mistake is that of supposing that morality is a subject like geology, or art-history, in which there are degrees of expertise, so that just as one can look to an art-historian, in virtue of his training, to determine whether some picture is a forgery, one can look to a philosopher to determine whether some action is wrong. The philosopher has no such training, not because of any defect in his education, but because there is no such thing as an authoritative guide to moral judgment, of which he could have acquired the mastery. So far as the conduct of life is concerned, he has no professional advantage over anyone else. The realization of this fact has tended in this century to lead moral philosophers to treat their subject as one of what is technically called the second order. Instead of trying to lay down moral maxims, they have concerned themselves rather with the definition of moral terms, the demarcations of judgments of value, the question whether, and if so how, they should be differentiated from statements of fact. More recently, without its being denied that these questions are important, there has been a tendency to ignore the ruling that moral philosophy should be restricted to them. Even though he can claim no special expertise, there is no reason why a moral philosopher should not advance, let us say, a novel theory of justice, if he thinks it worthy of general acceptance. There is equally no reason why he should not apply his intelligence to the solution of concrete moral problems such as the question when, if ever, men have the right to kill. Whether those who embark on such topics should be said to be engaging in philosophy is a verbal question of very little interest. What counts is the breadth and soundness of their arguments.
(6) A good example of the way in which a problem gains a sharper outline through long discussion is that of the stubborn question of the freedom of the will. The idea of there being a straightforward conflict between the thesis that all natural events, and consequently all human actions, are causally determined, and the thesis that men as moral agents elude the grasp of causal necessity, has proved to be deceptively simple. It conceals many knots that need to be untangled. In the first place, the thesis of determinism turns out to be empty, if it amounts to no more than the claim that every natural event can be brought under some generalization or other. It acquires content only when the laws which are supposed to reign in a given area are actually specified. Secondly, there is no call for any talk of necessity, unless it is simply a way of saying that the event in question fits into a causal pattern. The suggestion that it is therefore fated to occur is wantonly misleading. In fact, it has not yet been shown that human behaviour is subject to law, in the sense required, but the possibility that it will be found to be so cannot be ruled out. Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the science of physiology advances to the point where it can provide explanations for all human behaviour. It would not follow from this that men's actions could not also be explained in terms of their desires and beliefs, any more than from the fact that the moves of a chess-playing machine may be explained in terms of its programming and construction it follows that they cannot also be explained in terms of their function in the game. In short, if it were proved that men's actions were causally determined, it would not impair their claims to be rational agents. But would it then follow that their wills were free? Again, this is not a clear issue. If the question is whether they were able to do what they had chosen, the answer is plainly that they very often would. But this is not sufficient for the misguided theists who profess to find in God's gift of free-will to men a ground for relieving him of the responsibility for all the evils in the world which they suppose him to have created. They require not only that men be often free to do what they have chosen, but also that their choices themselves be free. But what are we to understand by this? That sometimes men's choices are causally inexplicable? That they do not always have reasons for choosing as they do? The first of these propositions must be held to be doubtful: the second may well be true. But even if they are both true, what is that to the purpose? Do we really want to conclude that men are responsible agents just to the extent that their actions are inexplicable? Our theist may protest that. this is a travesty of his position. He wants to credit men with the power of self determination. But what is this supposed to be? If it does not mean that men sometimes act spontaneously, or in other words that it is sometimes a matter of chance that they act as they do, it does not mean anything at all. But what sort of responsibility is it that is conferred only by chance? One can only conclude that the 'theological' concept of free will is utterly confused.
It is interesting to speculate whether this confusion extends to the concept of free will which is built into our everyday legal and moral judgments and also into the affective attitudes of pride or shame, gratitude or resentment, reverence or indignation, which the moral judgments sustain. I am strongly inclined to think that it does and therefore that our moral and legal judgments should be disinfected of it. At the same time I doubt if it is in my power to give up such attitudes as I have mentioned in favour of a strictly scientific approach to myself and my fellow men, and I doubt if I should wish to, even if it were in my power. I think, therefore, that there is a case for retaining a muddled concept of free will, just in so far as the myths which it engenders are salutary. .
(7) It has recently been proclaimed as a discovery that philosophy studies human thought and that the clue to the study of human thought lies in the analysis of the use of language. The first of these propositions is too general to be of much interest, even when we discount the fact that there are ways of studying human thought, such as appear in the records of psychological experiments, which are not philosophical, though there is no reason why a philosopher, who is concerned, for example, with the mechanisms of perception, should not draw upon their results. The second proposition also needs to be made more precise. The study of language has many facets and not all of them have any obvious bearing on philosophy. It is not clear, for example, what philosophical moral is in general to be drawn from comparative philology, or from the tracing of etymologies, though here again there may be something philosophically suggestive in the different meanings given in different languages, or at different periods in the same language, to words such as we commonly translate as 'substance' or 'cause'. Nevertheless, it is true that many of the traditional problems of philosophy have revealed themselves as being closely connected with questions of language: the problem of self-identity, for example, with the analysis of the use of proper names and other singular terms; the problem of universals with the explanation of the use of general terms; the problem of truth with an account of the assertion of indicative sentences. There is also the point that analysing the use of words can be a way of revealing the nature of what the words designate. For instance, if we can specify the conditions under which the sentence form 'x remembers y' is satisfied, we have answered the question what memory is.
(8) For my own part, I think that if one were looking for a single phrase to capture the stage to which philosophy has progressed, 'the study of evidence' would be a better choice than 'the study of language'. The study of evidence includes the study of language, since in order to discover what support propositions of one type bestow on those of another, we need to know what is meant by the sentences by which the propositions are respectively expressed. Indeed, the. two operations go together. Similarly, the enquiry into the nature of something such as memory through an analysis of the sentences in which words like 'remembering' occur can equally well be represented as a study of the grounds for the acceptance of memory-claims. But the study of evidence goes further, inasmuch as it does not limit us, as 'the study of language' appears to do, to elucidating the content of our beliefs, but also raises the question of our warrant for holding them; and this is surely a philosophical question when it is conceived in sufficiently general terms. Finally, we can give 'the study of evidence' a broad enough interpretation to make it cover two questions which have returned into the forefront of philosophical interest. What are we justified in taking these to be? and How far is what there is of our own making?
